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G.F.

17 March 1986

NOTE FOR: C/NIC

FROM: Hal Ford/Graham Fuller

SUBJECT: DCI's Note on Evaluation of Special Paper on Philippines
(and other subjects)

1. In our view, the stream of consciousness in DCI's note is that US intelligence has on several occasions sounded timely warnings/concerns which, had they resulted in timely policy follow-ons, would have well served US interests. In fact, however, the only results were intel-policy disconnects, in part because the intel concerns voiced were uncongenial to consumers committed to policy success. (By coincidence, this general question is one of the subjects the NIC will be especially discussing 9 April [redacted])

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2. Now who does what?

-- [redacted] Philippine Thinkpiece. We don't consider that this paper, however excellent, would have contributed as much to the immediate US-Philippine policy scene as did various other pieces NIO/EA and CIA were preparing in the months and weeks before Marcos' fall. [redacted] paper does have considerable so-what, however, for the long-range -- and even more now than before Cory's victory. As a first step, we could translate [redacted] paper into a formal Estimate, in the process (and thereafter) providing for considerable interchange with State and other policymakers.

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-- Beyond this one Philippine paper, there remains much the NIC can/should do to heighten the vigor and imaginativeness of our marketing of Estimates (DCI, NIOs, etc.).

-- The questions the DCI raises in paras 2 and 3 of his note would be good projects for post-mortems by SRP. Our horseback recollections (hold those metaphors) are that intel did well on those occasions, but candid examinations would be worthwhile whatever their findings.

3. If such examinations did find that intel had indeed done well but to little policy avail, then the case would be strengthened for serious

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high-level consideration of ways and means to provide more systematic followthrough and use of intel -- at senior policymaking levels -- than has yet obtained. Of particular importance would be a policy group derived to review on a regular basis any major gaps between intelligence and policy.

4. In any event, we would welcome a chance to discuss these questions with you and the DCI, at an early opportunity, (a) to insure that we interpret DCI's interests correctly, and (b) to find how the NIC can best do its part in help meeting these questions.




Hal Ford



Graham Fuller

cc: Graham Fuller
Hal Ford
NIO/EA



WJ att.

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15 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Special Paper on Philippines

1. The current African paper reminds me that I would like to see, while it is fresh in our minds, an evaluation of the special paper on the Philippines which SecState found too dismal. It seems to me now that it provided a kind of perspective which could have gotten some thinking started on the kind of situation which ultimately developed and, if properly considered, might have been helpful in the preparation for the actual solution.

2. Also, I think we should take a thorough retrospective look at the relevance, the accuracy, the value of our reporting and analytical judgments in developing Lebanon, Syria and the situation leading up to the Israeli invasion and continuing through our attempts to solve that problem and the aftermath to date.

3. Also, probably as a separate effort, I would like to see the same kind of retrospective look at reporting and analysis on the peace process from the period before the Reagan Initiative of 1982 down through the Jordanian, PLO, Syrian and Israeli gyrations to date.


William J. Casey

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